Femona{nationalism and the “Regular” Army of Labor Called Migrant Women
Sara R. Farris

The First World takes on a role like that of the old-fashioned male in the family—pampered, entitled, unable to cook, clean, or find his socks. Poor countries take on a role like that of the traditional woman within the family—patient, nurturing and self-denying. A division of labor feminists critiqued when it was “local” has now, metaphorically speaking, gone global.


This depiction of the relation between the First World and the Global South in terms of the sexual division of labor within the household should not be understood as merely a metaphor for the power relations and uneven development engendered by neoliberal globalization. Rather, it should be taken quite literally: poor countries increasingly provide the nannies and maids who work in rich countries. The current percentage of women “in the world’s international migrants population” as Andrew R. Morrison, Maurice Schiff, and Mirja Sjöblom, authors of the first World Bank report on women’s international migrations argue, “is close to half.” The dramatic rise of these feminized migration flows is to a great extent due to the increasing demand for workers in the care and domestic industry, with Europe constituting no exception. Nonetheless, the image of the immigrant as male Gastarbeiter (guest worker) that was diffused in the 1950s and 1960s, when Europe received the first significant flows of foreigners from all over the world, has not been replaced by the figure of the migrant as female maid. Rather, when women migrants are mentioned at all, they are portrayed as veiled and oppressed Orientalist objects. The public debate on the role of migrations and contemporary Europe’s status as a multicultural laboratory has indeed been dominated by an insidious discursive strategy that tends to obscure the importance of those women as care and domestic workers and instead represents them as victims of their own culture.

This article uses a political-economic theoretical framework to intervene in the complex discursive strategies of “femonationalism,” or the contem-
porary mobilization of feminist ideas by nationalist parties and neoliberal governments under the banner of the war against the perceived patriarchy of Islam in particular, and of migrants from the Global South in general. Recent discourses about multiculturalism and migrants’ integration, particularly in the case of Muslims, have been strongly marked by demands for migrants to adapt to Western culture and values. We should note that one of the essential items in such a list of values is gender equality. The mobilization, or rather instrumentalization, of the notion of women’s equality both by nationalist and xenophobic parties and by neoliberal governments constitutes one of the most important characteristics of the current political conjuncture, particularly in Europe. From Marine Le Pen’s recent pronouncements in defense of “white” French people, women, and homosexuals from the perils they encounter in the banlieues, to the Italian Northern League’s and the British National Party’s recurrent attacks against immigrants, to widespread claims that the entrance of a supposedly Muslim Turkey in Europe constitutes a threat for European women, to Geert Wilders’s disturbing filmic portrayal of Islam as an evil and misogynist religion and culture, the proclaimed defense of women constitutes a common denominator of the so-called new radical Right in Europe, as well as an insidious argument increasingly deployed by neoliberal governments and the mass media across the continent.

This mobilization has divided feminist intellectuals and activists. On the one hand, some feminists, among them Alice Schwarzer in Germany, Elisabeth Badinter in France, and Cisca Dresselhuys in the Netherlands, have endorsed the idea that Islam is fundamentally misogynist. Since it is considered a religion that asserts the subordinated role of women in society and that exerts a strict control over their sexuality, Islam is argued to be against women’s emancipation tout court. Its male representatives, as well as its cultural and religious practices, therefore need to be reprimanded. On the other hand, other feminists—and here one might think of Christine Delphy in France, Annamaria Rivera in Italy, and Anja Meulenbelt in the Netherlands—have criticized such a characterization of Islam as an overgeneralization, warning against its potentially racist implications. In particular, they emphasize the need to support Muslim women’s own initiative for self-determination against what they see as patronizing attempts at protection from the outside; they criticize nationalist-xenophobic parties’ and neoliberal governments’ claims of concern for women’s rights as hypo-
critical and destined to exacerbate an Islamophobic climate. I should admit at the outset that my position is close to that of the latter group. The current contraposition between male and female Muslims, with the latter playing the role of the passive victims of non-Western male “congenital violence” who require protection, can be regarded as constituting the contemporary form of a well-known Western mythology, or an “old ploy” as Leila Ahmed calls it, namely, that of the “white men [claiming to be] saving brown women from brown men,” to use Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s apposite phrase.³

For instance, it could be remembered that while current media and political discourses focus on male Muslims as oppressors, the “male immigrant threat” in the 1990s was depicted as coming from Eastern Europe. The bad immigrant was then embodied by Eastern European men, usually portrayed as involved in criminal activities, while women from these countries were often depicted as victims of a backward culture.⁴ As Helma Lutz noted, “It is through discourses of ‘racial,’ ethnic and national otherness, rather than through sexual difference, that the antagonism between the ‘European’ and the ‘other’ woman is emphasized. In this binary, the European woman serves as the standard against which to measure women from elsewhere.”⁵ The image of the migrant woman from non-Western countries as passive subject of the violent patriarchy of her culture thus has a long history; one could argue that, in the present context, Muslim women play the role of a synecdoche for the European stereotype of the female immigrant “portrayed as a particular kind of deviation from ‘European’ femininity—perhaps unconsciously functioning as counter-images or alter-egos of European feminine self-images.”⁶

Keeping these historical perspectives in mind, in this intervention I aim to extend the critique of the current instrumentalization of feminist themes beyond the largely culturalist terms that have been prominent in recent debates. In particular, I hope to open a discussion about the political-economic dimensions of these processes, which seem to me to have been either overlooked or insufficiently analyzed. I will, thus, focus on the various attempts to employ “gender” in contemporary discussions of migrants’—and especially Muslims’—integration by means of some of the conceptual tools offered by Karl Marx’s discussion in Capital of the “reserve army of labor” in its current problematization.
What is Femonationalism?

I propose to employ the concept of “femonationalism” to address the political economy of the discursive formation that brings together the heterogeneous anti-Islam and anti-(male) immigrant concerns of nationalist parties, some feminists, and neoliberal governments under the idea of gender equality. The term “femonationalism” recalls to a certain extent Jasbir K. Puar’s notion of “homonationalism.” Puar uses this notion to identify the “discursive tactic that disaggregates US national gays and queers from racial and sexual others, foregrounding a collusion between homosexuality and American nationalism that is generated both by national rhetorics of patriotic inclusion and by gay and queer subjects themselves.” The terrain of “collusion” is seen in the opposition to the (Islamic) terrorist as homophobe and enemy of American civilization.

In similar ways, femonationalism describes the attempts of European right-wing parties, among others, to co-opt feminist ideals into anti-immigrant and anti-Islam campaigns. However, my use of the term femonationalism does not imply collusion or a conscious alliance between feminists and nationalists, nor does it attribute national patriotic rhetorics to an indistinct agent like Europe or European governments as a whole. On the one hand, despite the fact that several well-known European feminist intellectuals have spoken against Islam and called for the ban of the veil, their reasons are entirely different from those that animate nationalist parties. On the other hand, despite the rise of different forms of patriotism across the political spectrum, I use the notion of “nationalism” to indicate the explicit ideology deployed by right-wing parties in contemporary Europe and selectively, as well as conveniently, utilized by neoliberal governments: an ideology composed of chauvinism, the myth of a common ethnic kinship, and xenophobia.

But why is it important to provide an analysis of femonationalism at the political-economic level? And what would it mean to trace its political-economic contours? We can begin with the first question. Despite the fact that several authors have identified and criticized the usage of a certain feminist lexicon by contemporary European nationalists, I believe that most critical attempts have paid little attention to political-economic elements. On the one hand, several authors have provided useful descriptions and reconstructions of the process of such an instrumentalization in ways that have had the merit...
of uncovering the performative contradiction of nationalist-xenophobic parties’ and governments’ legal proposals. On the other hand, other accounts have tried to understand the current mobilization of gender as an ideological and instrumental cover up for neo-imperialist and even fundamentalist projects. Thus, several authors have argued that claims to liberate Muslim women by unveiling them is a classically colonialist/missionary position. These authors detect strong traces of neocolonialist and assimilationist projects behind the deception of the new missionary expeditions that are presented as philanthropic—or rather, as “philogynist.” Furthermore, notions such as “enlightened fundamentalism” and “secular humanism” have suggested that the legacies of secularism and the Enlightenment “as the foundation of Western European culture” are employed in a fundamentalist fashion. Thus, these authors emphasize that the goal of “philogynist” claims and Western secular fundamentalism, which is not different in this respect from religious fundamentalisms, is to redefine gender roles.

Nonetheless, despite the crucial importance of these analyses, I would like to propose that we need to go further and to ask the following questions: (a) Why is it that “gender equality,” rather than another weapon from the Western arsenal of universal values, is so widely mobilized against Islam? and (b) Is there something specific to women, particularly to non-Western women, and more precisely, something specific to their political-economic role in the current conjuncture, which could explain why they, as opposed to non-Western men, have been targeted by femonationalist discourses?

The Gendered Side of Integration

One of the main ways in which Western “enlightened fundamentalism” tries to impose its idea of gender equality and women’s liberation on non-Western and Muslim migrant women is by arguing that their adoption of a Western female lifestyle would facilitate not only their own integration into Western society, but also the integration of the community to which they belong. Women are in this perspective regarded as the “vectors of integration,” in a way that can often seem close to the supposedly different model of “assimilation.” It is necessary, however, to analyze the specific ways in which calls for such an integration/assimilation are differentially addressed to men and women from migrant communities.

Discourses about immigrants’ integration, not only those pronounced by nationalist-xenophobic parties, but also those of more mainstream perspec-
For these accounts, it is men, and not women, who create trouble for the process of integration in several ways. First, men are regarded as the real obstacle to social and cultural integration, and thus represent a cultural threat to European society. Even when it is the veiled woman who seems to be targeted as a cultural danger, she is depicted as if she does so not on the basis of a personal choice—since Muslim women in these accounts are denied agency—but because she is oppressed by men. Second, and perhaps most importantly, men and women are perceived and depicted in different and often opposed ways at the level of economic integration. Xenophobic-nationalist slogans that call for “jobs for the nationals” (which are important for the electoral affirmation of these parties) should be read, I suggest, as “jobs for national men.”

A closer look at the differences between migrant men and women, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, in the European economic arena will enable us to shed further light on some of the reasons for the “treacherous sympathy” claimed by European nationalist movements for feminist demands.

The Peculiarity of Female Migrant Labor

Male migrant workers in Western economies play the role of what Marx called a “reserve army of labor,” namely, a surplus laboring population of the unemployed and underemployed whose existence is “a necessary product” of capitalist accumulation and whose constant reproduction is used by employers to maintain low wages. Nowadays, particularly in Southern Europe, migrants are frequently perceived as constituting a reserve of cheap labor whose presence threatens national workers with job losses or a lowering of their incomes. Yet, female migrant labor is neither presented nor perceived in the same way. Why is this the case?

Half of the current migrant population in the Western world is constituted by women. In Europe, for instance, the estimates reveal that women make up slightly more than half of the migrant stock in the twenty-seven-member European Union. A large number of migrant women, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, who actively participate in the Western labor market are employed in one single branch of the economy: the care and domestic sector. The increased participation of national women in the productive economy after the Second World War, the decline of the birthrate and the mounting number of elderly people, coupled with the erosion, insufficiency,
or simply non-existence of public or affordable care services, has resulted in the marketization of so-called reproductive labor, which is done mainly by migrant women. The demand for labor in this sector has grown so much over the past ten years that it is now regarded as the main reason for the feminization of migration.16

In order to understand the exception constituted by migrant women in contemporary Europe as a migrant workforce that seems to be spared from accusations of economic and social as well as cultural threat—in other words, in order to decipher one of the justifications to which femonalism appeals—we therefore need to look more closely at the care and domestic sector.

**The Non-Disposable Materiality of Affective/Reproductive Labor**

What distinguishes the care and domestic sector, where female migrants are mostly employed, from other sectors that employ mostly male migrants? First, the care and domestic sector is perhaps the most gendered labor market insofar as constructions of femininity have been enduringly associated with it and therefore have been constitutive elements in the formation of its skills, working culture, and identity formation.17 As Lutz argues, domestic and care work is “not just another labour market.”18 It is not simply work, but a “core activity of doing gender. . . . Outsourcing household and care work to another woman is widely accepted because it follows and perpetuates the logic of gender display in accordance with institutionalized genderisms.”19 Furthermore, affectivity is a fundamental—albeit not exclusive—component of care and domestic or reproductive labor.20 The intimate nature of the context in which it is performed (the household), the highly emotional character of the tasks involved (caring for children and/or the elderly, cooking, looking after the house, i.e., the employer’s nest of intimacy *par excellence*) and, therefore, the importance of trust in the work relationship, are all aspects that make it much more difficult for employers to replace the worker once a relation of reliance is in place. The highly affective character of care and domestic labor is also one of the core difficulties encountered by attempts to mechanize and automate it. As Silvia Federici argues,

> Unlike commodity production, the reproduction of human beings is to a great extent irreducible to mechanization, being the satisfaction of complex needs, in which physical and affective elements are inextricably combined, requiring a high degree of human
interaction and a most labor-intensive process. This is most evident in the reproduction of children and the elderly that even in its most physical component involves providing a sense of security, anticipating fears and desires. None of these activities is purely “material” or “immaterial,” nor can they be broken down in ways making it possible for them to be mechanized or replaced by the virtual world of online communication.

One of the consequences of this resistance to mechanization is not only that domestic and care work has been mostly redistributed onto the shoulders of migrant women or partly commercialized, but also that it is one of those sectors where Marx’s analysis of the reserve army of labor cannot be easily applied. The discussion of the creation of a surplus-laboring population, or reserve army, is strictly related to Marx’s analysis of the organic composition of capital and the tendency of capitalist accumulation to encourage the increase “of its constant, at the expense of its variable constituent,” namely, the increase of the mass and value of the means of production at the cost of the mass and value of living labor employed in the production process. A crucial element for the reduction of variable capital is indeed technical development and automation, which, alongside other factors, leads to the expulsion of a number of workers from the productive process and therefore to the creation of the reserve army. However, the resistance of care and domestic labor to mechanization means that only a small amount of labor can be replaced by the technical development of the means of production. It mostly has to be performed by living labor, whether commodified through the recruitment of care and domestic workers in private households or through the growth of commercial services (fast food, laundry and so forth), or performed for free by members of the family-household.

As a consequence, the demand for care and domestic work in private households, particularly in a situation in which reproductive tasks are increasingly outsourced and commodified, is destined to grow dramatically in the future. It is thus not by chance that a recent International Labour Organization report on the impact of the global economic crisis on migrant workers shows that the sectors where migrant women are more concentrated “have not been affected by the crisis”; indeed these sectors have “even expanded in its context. This is the case of sectors such as health and social work, the highest employer of women migrant workers, social and personal services, and education.” As the report further explains, women’s labor migration may have been less affected than men’s.
Providers of Jobs and Welfare

As I have previously noted, the increasing participation of women in the labor market in the last twenty years, which was followed neither by a growth of public care services nor by changes in the sexual division of labor within the household, has certainly been one of the reasons for the growing demand for private care workers and domestic workers, and a powerful impetus for the feminization of contemporary migration flows. Yet, as Fiona Williams and Anna Gavanas clearly note, “it is not simply the lack of public provision that shapes the demand for childcare [and elderly care], but the very nature of state support that is available.” In countries such as Britain, Spain, Finland, and France, forms of cash provision or tax credit have been introduced in order to assist in buying help for childcare on the market. Furthermore, in Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, and Austria, for example, forms of direct payment have been made available which allow older or disabled people to buy support and assistance. Both cash provisions and direct payment have encouraged the development of the commodification of care or domestic services, which are generally sought privately on the market, where migrant women provide the lion’s share of supply.

The growing demand for care and domestic workers in Europe, which is due both to the generalized privatization of care services, thus prompting families to look for this solution on the market, and to the higher rates of national women’s participation in the labor market, which often involves them being obliged to find gender-acceptable replacements for themselves in the household, are very important factors that explain why female migrant labor does not receive the same treatment as its male counterpart. Evidence for this can be found in the different ways in which current campaigns and policies against illegal migration affect men and women. The Italian and German cases in this respect are particularly emblematic because they show how different policy cultures and migration histories present similar approaches towards irregular immigration when care and domestic services are at stake. In 2009, the Italian government granted an amnesty only for illegal migrants working as caregivers (badanti) and domestic workers, who are mostly women, since that was considered the only sector where the demand for labor could not meet the national supply. In Germany, on the other hand, Lutz and Palenga-Möellenbeck describe the state’s attitude towards illegal migrant care workers in terms of “semi-compliance.” For instance, Eastern
Europeans (who constitute the majority among care and domestic workers in Germany) “have residency but no working rights, so that the violation of rights is restricted to labor law and not to residency.”39 As they put it, “the German government seems to appreciate this by a de facto relatively liberal intervention policy.”30 The paramount example is the behavior of the German state in 2004, when it introduced a taskforce for dealing with undocumented migrant work. Officers prosecuted illegal employment in workplaces in the public sphere, but not in private households. The problems faced by families within the household in the management of child and elderly care encountered the “understanding” of state functionaries who, as a result, did “not perceive the employment of undocumented care workers as ‘punishable.’”31

Rather than job stealers, cultural clashers, and welfare provision parasites, migrant women are the maids who help to maintain the well-being of European families and individuals. They are the providers of jobs and welfare: they are those who, by helping European women to undo gender by substituting for them in the household, allow those national women to become laborers in the productive labor market. Furthermore, migrant women contribute to the education of children and to the survival and emotional life of the elderly, thus providing the welfare goods from whose provision states increasingly retreat.

**The Regular Army of Labor Called Migrant Women**

The female migrant workforce thus seems to amount not to a reserve army, constantly threatened with unemployment and deportation and used in order to maintain wage discipline, but to a regular army of extremely cheap labor. This idea in a certain sense seems to run counter to the so-called “domestic labor debate” initiated by feminists in the late 1970s and 1980s.32 In that debate, the concept of the reserve army of labor was used in order to account for the structural income biases and precarious working and contractual conditions of women who were then entering the labor market as wageworkers in increasing numbers.33 As Floya Anthias noted, it had become “an almost unproblematic reference to depict women as an RAL [reserve army of labor],” particularly in Marxist-feminist discussions.34

The opposition between these two approaches, however, is more apparent than real because the unit of analysis to which the two concepts are applied—reserve and regular army—are rather different. While feminists debating the concept of the reserve army in the 1970s and 1980s were referring to women...
as extra-domestic wage laborers, I propose to employ the notion of regular army to describe what happens to migrant women engaged in commodified reproductive labor. The change of focus enables us to see that not only is the economic sector internally differentiated, but also that the women to whom the two concepts refer do not belong to the same homogenous universal called womanhood. Rather, they inhabit diverse worlds of experience strongly marked by class, and particularly racial, differences.

Insofar as the women who are employed in the care and domestic sector are migrants mainly coming from the Global South and former state-socialist countries, the most appropriate term for understanding their working conditions is neither the indeterminate abstraction of wage labor in general nor of women’s work in particular, but rather, the determinate abstraction of migrant labor. Migrant labor in contemporary European and Western societies is configured in specific forms: it is “labor on the move,” as a result of the uneven development brought about by what David Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession,” and it is “disposable labor,” with a distinctive economic as well as political status. Moreover, in the world of migrant workers, migrant women’s labor seems to obey its own rules. On the one hand, it follows the rules of gender and the “sexual contract” within the household, which establishes that women are still in charge of reproduction and care. Further, it follows the rules of the “racial contract,” according to which ethnic minorities and people of color perform the least desirable and valued tasks in a society. Migrant women are currently a regular army of reproductive labor, that is, the labor at the foundation of any collectivity. Reproductive labor is that “species of activity that includes everything we do to maintain, contain, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment.”

Conclusion

The useful role that female migrant labor plays in the contemporary restructuring of welfare regimes and the feminization of key sectors of the service economy accounts in a significant way for a certain indulgence by neoliberal governments and for the deceptive compassion of nationalist parties towards migrant women (and not migrant men). We could further note that besides being extremely useful reproductive workers, female migrants are also reproductive bodies, whose birth rate is more than double that of national women. Despite attempts in the last few years by several
EU countries, to establish “the demographic advantage of a certain nationality,” as Judith Butler put it, calls for assimilation addressed to migrant women—Muslim and non-Muslim alike—identify a specific role for them within contemporary European societies, insofar as they are regarded as prolific bodies of future generations and as mothers who play a crucial role in the process of transmission of societal values. As a useful replacement in the reproductive sector for national women, but also as potential wives of European men, migrant women become the target of a deceivingly benevolent campaign in which they are needed as workers, tolerated as migrants, and encouraged as women to conform to Western values.

Two further elements should be considered in these concluding remarks, albeit briefly. The critique of femonationalism must attend to women’s specific placement within the circuit of the market economy, not only in terms of the role of women as producers and reproducers, but also when we consider them as consumers and even as commodities. As Hester Eisenstein argues, “if the goal of globalization is to create investment and marketing opportunities, and therefore acceptance of Western products along with Western norms, then in this context an image of a liberated Western woman becomes part of the sale. . . . Feminism, defined as women’s liberation from patriarchal constraints, is made the equivalent of participating in the market as a liberated individual.” Continuous capitalist expansion in the Global South as well as the full incorporation of all individuals into its logic in the richer North involves an extension and re-articulation of the ideology that C. B. Macpherson famously called “possessive individualism.” As possessive individuals, migrants integrated into Western societies—particularly female migrants—should conceive of their freedom in terms of their independence from communitarian boundaries and their capacity for endless consumption.

Migrant women, however, are also commodities, as the way in which they are expected to behave in accordance with the values of Western emancipated women reminds us. Here, by considering contemporary femonationalism as an ideological construction that needs to be understood also on the basis of the commodification of non-European women as such, I am arguing that we need to pursue the line of reasoning proposed by Alain Badiou a few years ago. After the law against the hijab in public schools was approved in France—a law that has come to epitomize the entire debate about the equation between Islam and women’s oppression—the French philosopher defined it as a “pure capitalist law.” For femininity to operate according to its function under capi-
talism, the female body has to be exposed in order to circulate “according to the market paradigm.” The Muslim girl therefore has to show “what she’s got to sell.” In other words, she needs to accept and endorse actively her commodification. The emphasis on the unveiling of Muslim women in Europe therefore combines both the Western male’s enduring dream of uncovering the woman of the enemy, or of the colonized, and the demand to end the incongruence of hidden female bodies as exceptions to the general law according to which they should circulate like “sound currency.”

We can thus argue that the rise of femonationalism needs to be understood as symptomatic of the distinctive position of Western and non-Western women in the economic, political, and lato sensu in the material chain of production and reproduction. The possibility that nationalist-xenophobic discourses could appropriate the central feminist ideals of equality and freedom emerges from the very specific reconfiguration of the labor markets, and migration, produced by neoliberal globalization in the last thirty years. Confronting femonationalism thus requires not only ideological refutation but also a concrete analysis of its political-economic foundations.

Sara R. Farris lectures at King’s College London and is Marie Curie Fellow in the Department of Sociology at the University of Cambridge. Her main areas of research are international migration, particularly female migration, classical and contemporary social and political theory, gender studies and intersectionality. She has published on Max Weber, orientalism and Edward Said, international female migration and second-generation migrant women in Europe.

Notes


4. For an overview of these debates see Eleonore Kofman et al., eds., Gender and International Migration in Europe: Employment, Welfare and Politics (2000).


6. Ibid.


10. For an account of the “intolerant” features of secularism and its relations to women’s rights, see particularly Scott, Politics of the Veil and Joan Wallach Scott, “Sexualism,” Ursula Hirschmann Annual Lecture on Gender and Europe, presented at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy, 2009.

11. Kofman et al., Gender and International Migration in Europe; Sara R. Farris et al., eds., La straniera: Informazioni, sito-bibliografie e ragionamenti su razzismo e sessismo (2009).


18. Lutz, Migration and Domestic Work, 1.
29. Ibid., 426.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.